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RELIGION AND REVOLUTION IN 
DURKHEIM AND SOREL 
Josep R. Lloberal 
Introduction 
At the beginning of this paper it is perhaps appropriate to men- 
tion to the reader that fate has handed me down a crooked deal 
in the form of an historical play in which the two main charac- 
ters refuse to talk to each other. Because aplay consisting mainly 
of monologues and asides could be extremely boring, 1 have 
decided to spice it up with what 1 believe are plausible dia- 
logues. 
The first, and foremost, personage of our drama is, of course, 
Emile Durkheim or rather, more specifically, the Durkheim of 
the Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse [EFRL]. Now, 1 
see the EFRL as a book for al1 seasons. this is well justified 
because, after all, Durkheim's most important objective in the 
book was ((comprendre la nature religieuse de l'homme, c'est a 
dire a révéler un aspect essentiel et permanent de lYhumanité» 
(Durkheim 1960: 2) [ttclarifying the religious nature of man, 
that is to say, of revealing an esential and permanent aspect of 
humanity)), Durkheim 1975: 1021. 
If what really concerns Durkheim is modern man, then, the 
text, dealing with the most primitive religion of mankind, is 
1. Antropbleg, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. 
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crying out loud to be applied to modern times. This is far from 
beinig a revolutionary innovation in the reading of the EFRL; 
inde:ed, much of the inspiration for my endeavour stems from 
Jeffrey Alexander (1 988)'s collection and, generally speaking, 
froni Norbert Bellah's studies on civil religion (Bellah 1970). 
In the conclusion to the EFRL Durkheim remarks that al1 
societies, if they want to survive, must maintain its unity and 
specific characteristics, and that the way to do that is byperiodi- 
cal gatherings in which individuals come together and through 
cereimonies and rituals strongly reassert their common senti- 
merits. It is irrelevant whether the assembly celebrates a strictly 
religious belief or an important event in the life of the nation 
(Durkheim 1960: 610). This statement, we might say, tells us 
hour societies keep together, how social order and solidarity is 
maintained. 
The problem with le lieu et le moment which constituted 
Durkheim's social milieu was that, in his view and that of many 
of his contemporaries, it lacked moral fibre; it was a period of 
malaise and mediocrity. Durkheim, however, was confident 
that «un jour viendra oii nos sociétés connaitront a nouveau des 
heuires d'effervescence créatrice (...) au cours desquelles de nou- 
veaidx idéaux surgiront, pendant un temp qui serviront de guide 
a lYliumanité» (Durkheim 1960: 61 1) [«the day will come when 
our societies will know once again hours of creative efferves- 
cencve in which new ideals will be born and new formulae will 
emerge which will for a time serve as a guide to humanity)), 
Durkheim 1975: 1571. This statement provides a framework for 
the explanation of how societies change. 
At this point it is perhaps appropriate to introduce the sec- 
ond personage of my historical play, and this is no other than the 
enigmatic andmuch-maligned figure of Georges Sorel, ingénieur 
de profession and jack of al1 ideological trades. My main pur- 
pose in this paper is to ellicit the common ground between 
Duskheim's EFRL and Sorel' ReJlections on Violente. This 
may seem a rather tal1 order or chimeric enterprise because no 
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two texts could apparently be more dissimilar than Sorel's 
Réflexions sur la violence (190611908) and Durkheim's Les 
Formes élémentaire de la vie religieuse (1912). Sorel's book 
unashamedly presents itself as a political tract aimed at creating 
a new proletarian morality centred on the idea of revolutionary 
violence; the avowed objective of the text is to annihilate the 
mediocre and decadent bourgeois society that surrounds him, 
and in the same motion create a rejuvenated, socialist society. 
Durkheim's book, it is well known, focuses essentially on the 
religion of the most primitive of societies - the Australian Abo- 
rigines. 
What 1 shall maintain in this paper is that, if there is a com- 
mon guiding thread through Reflections and the Elementary 
Forms or, even more generally, between the political projects 
of Sorel and Durkheim is their moral concern. In fact, what 
characterises and gives unity to the work of both men is the 
search for a new morality. This is a point which, in the case, of 
Durkheim needs no belabouring; as to Sorel, his life-long ideo- 
logical meanderings from catholicism to marxism, from marxism 
to syndicalism, from syndicalism to nationalism, from nation- 
alism to protofascism and from the latter to leninism, hide, 
among other things, a constant search for new ethical principles 
that can change the morally corrupt and declining bourgeois 
society in which he was forced to live. 
Hans Joas (1 993: 23) has remarked that there exist affinities 
between Sorel and Durkheim, but they can only be found if one 
places both authors in the proper intellectual scene of turn of the 
century France. And this means, among other things, to be pre- 
pared to accept that Sorel and Durkheim drew at times from the 
same philosophical sources. 
A final introductory proviso. This paper will mainly con- 
centrate on Sorel for the very simple reason that the pertinent 
sources of Durkheimian ideas are mostly found in the EFRL, 
Book 11, Chapter 7 and Conclusions. Both sections have been 
extensively quoted and analysed in the Durkheimian tradition 
1 O Josep R. Llobera 
(Pickering 1984) and it would perhaps be repetitive to dwell too 
much on them. 
Sorel and Durkheim: an overview 
Peter Nijhoff (1985: 263-64) has suggested that there are con- 
vergences and divergences between the works of Sorel and 
Durkheim. According to him it is possible to periodise these 
relationships in four major stages: 
1) 1894-1895. There is an attempt by both authors to reject 
a morality based on an individualist philosophy and to re- 
construct morality on the basis of social life. It is what 
Durkheim calls to treat the facts of moral life from a scien- 
tific perspective, while Sorel also emphasises that ethical 
ideas have social origins. 
There is, however, a difference in method. Durkheim fa- 
vours a rational reconstruction on the basis of technical 
progress. As he put it: (Not only does the division of labour 
exhibit that character by which we define morality, but it 
increasingly tends to become the essential condition for 
social solidarity)) (Durkheim 1984: 332). Under the joint 
influence of W. James and H. Bergson it is possible to ob- 
serve that Sorel takes a line based on what could be called 
'pragmatic activism'. 
2) 1895-1900. Both Durkheim and Sorel express a concern 
for the 'moral malaise' which is typical of the fin de siecle. 
It is not just a matter of highlighting the moral problem of 
modernity, which for many thinkers is a chronic problem. 
There is an urgency about this moral malaise. Implicit in 
that attitude is a critique of al1 kind of mechanical and de- 
terministic conceptions of human ideas. What we see in 
both authors is that they accord a ((growing significance to 
the relative autonomy of mental constructions» (Nijhoff 
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1985: 263). In Suicide Durkheim refers to the fact that so- 
cial life consists of representations; Sorel refers also to 
representations, that is, collective moral sentiments. So- 
cialist ethics is the result of the progressive organisation of 
the socialist movement. Later on the key word for Sorel will 
be 'myth'. 
3) 1900-1908. This stage could be superficially described 
as one of antagonism between Durkhein and Sorel. It is a 
period in which sociology is institutionalised by Durkheim; 
the discipline also becomes more politicised. There follows 
amore unitary and doctrinaire conception of sociology. Sorel 
denounces sociologists as 'professionals of a secular cult'. 
He rejects the idea of a sociological school (and the 
Durkheimian School in particular), and favours a more di- 
verse and independent approach. 
However, during this period there is a progressive spiri- 
tualisation of the social question in Durkheim. He places 
successively his hopes in industrial development, the de- 
velopment of professional corporations and education. As 
to Sorel, his faith in revolutionary syndicalism is no obsta- 
cle for a commitment to the role of ideas and emotions as 
motors of history. 
4) 1908-1914. In this period Durkheim pursues his evolu- 
tionary tendency towards giving prominent attention to the 
social function of religion. This culminates in the publica- 
tion of EFRS in 19 12. 
Sorel, for his part, discovers new reasons for thinking that 
certitude emanates from both religious experience and sci- 
entific experimentation, but believes that these two activi- 
ties cannot take place inside the centralised and hierarchical 
structures of, respectively, the Church and the University. 
What is required is an asceticism which is only found among 
those who have withdrawn from the official world. 
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Sorel and his intellectual milieu 
Sorel is much more open than Durkheim in admitting intellec- 
tual influences in his work. The idea of myth as an instinctive 
unconscious process is central to Sorel's work, and inparticular 
to his Reflections on Violente. The sources of this concept can 
be traced back to a variety of authors: Vico's ricorsi, Bergson's 
élari vital, Le Bon's crowd psychology, Tarde's imitation, etc. 
As we shall see in more detail later, al1 attempts to pin down 
Durkheim's concept of effervescence to the influence of Le 
Bori, and generally of the so called crowd psychology, have 
been spurned. As to Bergsonian influences, the issue has been 
hardly touched upon. Last but no least, one couldraise the issue 
of Sorel's possible influence on Durkheim. However, as 1 said 
in tlie Introduction, my aim is more modest: to detectparalellisms 
bet~neen Sorel and Durkheim and to explore their common in- 
tellectual sources. 
Although Sorel has often been presented as a Marxist (at 
leasit a sui generis Marxist), there are many differences between 
Mairxism and Sorelism. One which is particularly relevant to 
our endeavours is the role of religion and morality. While Marx 
and Engels tended to see these concepts in epiphenomenal terms, 
Sorel believed that they had to be treated as important catego- 
ries of social life. What is stake here is that Sorel asserts the 
centrality of human wP11; the idea that it is conscious human 
action that changes society. His socialism is hence much more 
voluntaristic than that of Marx. 
It was in the context of labouring on the issue of working 
clasis consciousness that Sorel developed the idea ofrevolution- 
ary images as myths. Myths, which were to be carefully distin- 
guished from utopias (or intellectual constructions), were con- 
ceived as «the expressions of a will to act on reality so as to 
change it» (Portis 1980: 57). For the proletariat the myth of 
modern times was the general strike. And the vision of a goal 
towards which the proletariat was working was the revolution. 
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In a nutshell, Sorel described the general strike as «the myth 
within which al1 of socialism is contained; that is, it involves a 
complex of images capable of naturally evoking al1 the feelings 
which are raised in the struggle of the socialist movement against 
contemporary society)) (ibid: 46). 
Sorel became interested in Marx at the same time that he 
became interested in Vico, and it would be fair to say that Sorel 
looked at Marx through Vichian eyes. Sorel long study on Vico 
was published in Le Devenir Social in 1896. At a general level, 
Sorel emphasises two key Vichian ideas: ((History has to be un- 
derstood as the history of human ideas and history has to be seen 
as the history ofhuman creation (hence the centrality of ethics))) 
(Jennings 1 9 8 3 : 3 3 0) 
As a result of Vico's influence, Sorel tended to envisage 
Marx's law of the collapse of capitalism in metaphysical terms, 
that is, as social poetry, as social myth. Although Sorel's idea 
of myth stems from a long tradition (which most probably in- 
cludes Durkheim), his most immediate and relevant source is 
Vico. For Vico myth is a ((source of non-rational human moti- 
vation)) (Jennings 1985: 122). 
This myth as a form of consciousness is typical of the primi- 
tive beginnings, that is, what Vico calls ideal history. Accord- 
ing to Vico, in the rudimentary forms of society, that is, among 
savages and barbarians, there is no solution of continuity be- 
tween the past (a domain in which affectivity dominates) and 
the future (a domain in which activity dominates). ((Myth, which 
is a fragment ofhuman history transfigured by primitive thought, 
transforms itself naturally into a répresentation of the future, 
that is, into a mobilising image)) (Juillard 1990: VII). What 
Sorel borrowed from Vico was a decription of the ((psychologi- 
cal evolution of the human intellect and, in particular, from the 
idea that at the beginning of this evolution man thought instinc- 
tively and practically, not rationally)) (Jennings 1985: 122). 
Jennings remarks that, at this early stage in Sorel's intellec- 
tual evolution, there is no influence of Bergson, but that by the 
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time Sorel came to write ReJlections (1 906) Bergsonian notions 
were superimposed on Sorel's Vichian concept of myth (ibid). 
Another important influence of Vico on Sorel was the reassess- 
merit of the role of religious beliefs in society. As a consequence 
of it, Sorel came to accept the social legitimacy of religion. It no 
longer made sense to him whether religion was true or false; the 
important matter was that religious beliefs were the result of 
deep-seated convictions (Jennings 1983 : 335). 
Vico's famous cyclical theory of decline and rebirth (ricorsi) 
could provide an adequate explanation for the continued exist- 
ente of Christianity. However, what mattered most to Sorel 
were the characteristics of early Christianity - aperiod in which 
religion was quasi-instinctive because the early Christians 
thoiight in terms of myths (austerity, heroism, revolt, etc). «Al1 
qualities ascribed to early Christianity were subsequently at- 
tribilted by Sorel to the merging syndicalist movement)) (Jennings 
1983: 337). 
To sum up. Sorel is critica1 of Marx's conviction that «re- 
ligion must disappear in the face of science (.. .) Religion always 
find elements of rejuvenation in the mystical)) (ibid: 336). At a 
widler level, it is obvious that what Sorel rejects in Marx, and 
specially in his followers, is economic determinism. To explain 
ideas and sentiments one must refer to the psychological evo- 
lution of society; to how the ideas of duty, conscience and rea- 
son evolve. As a revolutionary syndicalist Sorel will say with 
Vico that a ricorso can only take place «when the popular soul 
returns to aprimitive state, when everything is instinctive, crea- 
tive, poetic)) (Sorel 1905: 273). In this context, it is possible to 
say that strikes engender sentiments of fraternity, of union, of 
heroism; they represent the victory of the instinctive over bour- 
geoi S intellectualism (Jennings 1983: 340). 
1 have mentioned in passing that by the time Sorel came to 
write ReJlections the influence of Bergson was quite visible. 
Neither Sorel nor Bergson made a secret out of that, and al- 
tho-tlgh Bergson never endorsed Sorel's politics he admitted 
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that Sorel was a good interpreter of his work, and that he also 
admired him intellectually. As Horowitz has put it: ((Both were 
responding to a cultural milieu, and both did a great deal to 
shape the specifics of this milieu while drawing sustenance 
from each other)) (Horowitz 196 1 : 43). 
Bergson' Essai sur les donnés immediates de la conscience 
(1889) [Time and Free Will] was an important influence on a 
Sorel who was concerned with mobilising the working class. 
The point was how to convince mento change the world. In the 
myth of the general strike he found a source of energy which 
would maintain the tension against the established, bourgeois 
order, and in the final resort would contribute to its downfall. 
In 1907 Bergson published L 'évolution créatrice [Creative 
Evolution] in which he ((postulated the existence of an all-per- 
vading élan vital (vital impulse) that carries life, by more and 
more complex forms, to higher and higher destinies)) (Jennings 
1983: 139). Sorel applied Bergson7s ideas to human activity, to 
the purposes of groups. 
The Bergsonian concept of intuition was seen by Sorel as 
relevant to the description of the modern socialist movement, 
although he rejected Bergson7s attempts to use biology to ex- 
plain social facts. On the other hand, Sorel saw sympathetically 
the Bergsonian idea of religious (or rather spiritual) renais- 
sance, and his rejection of rationalism and scientism. 
For Sorel, following Bergson, ((both religion and revolu- 
tionary myths occupy the profounder region of our mental life)) 
(Nye 1973: 428). Sorel envisaged the ((apotheosis of the general 
strike as a moral purification of the world, as an end in itself; 
this typifies his chialistic (millennarian) attitude)) (Sonn 1989: 
271). It would be inappropriate, however, to extract the wrong 
conclusions from these statements; in spite of the analogies 
between religion and socialism (and particularly of the sym- 
bolic force of both Christianity and religion), Sorel suggests 
that each has unique psychological characteristics (Sorel 1990: 
84-5). 
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Perhaps it would be useful to illustrate Sorel's subtle posi- 
tiori concerning the comparison between religion and social- 
isrni. Pareto said somewhere that Sorel was a believer, at least 
for a while, in the divinity of the proletariat. Sorel had observed 
thait both early Christianity and the French Revolution had «de- 
riví:d their dynamic force from myths that aroused in their ad- 
herlents a self-sacrificing enthusiasm capable of transcending 
the ordinary difficulties standing in the way of cooperation 
among individuals, so Sorel thought that the myth of the general 
striyke might offer the proletariat a similar basis for a common 
inspiration and purpose arising from needs already manifested 
among the workers themselves. By giving to these needs an epic 
character, Sorel believed that the syndicalist myth with its mili- 
tant conception of a violent class war might very well engender 
qua.lities of personal resposibility and personal significance)) 
(Humphrey 195 1 : 209). As 1 said above, for Sorel it may not be 
valiid to trace socialism and religion back to the same psycho- 
log.ica1 forces, but the evolution of both movements produces 
similar effects in society, and hence makes the comparison in- 
teresting. 
Bouglé coined the term Bergsonian syndicalism to refer t s  
the impact of Bergson's doctrines on Sorel and his colleagues 
during the first decade of this century. Paramount among 
Bergson's ideas in this context is his reject of intellectualism. 
In t:he able hands of the Bergsonian syndicalists the concept of 
élari vital transforms itself into the concept of élan ouvrier. As 
pragmatists of sorts, they give primacy to action. It is interesting 
to nnention in passing, that the ((Jamesian impact came at a late 
stage in Sorel's life)) (Horowitz 196 1 : 43). His book L 'utilitd du 
pragmatisme (1921) can be seen as «a statement of staunch 
support for James at the expense of Bergson)) (ibid). 
According to Bouglé it is plain that Sorel preaches the sepa- 
ration of the working class from the rest of society as a means 
to enhance class authenticity; only in this way can the working 
class give rise to a new morality. As we know, myth is the 
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precondition for the existence of action; but a myth is «not a 
description of things but an expression of will». Bouglé, of 
course, points out that Sorel never asks the question of how 
society will be reorganised; only the creation of heroism mat- 
ters (Bouglé 1909: 412). 
The Bergsonian element is also present in Sorel's cal1 to the 
synthesis of dynamic images. As he put it: ((strikes have created 
in the proletariat the most noble and dynamic sentiments. The 
general strike has a unifying effect and increases the intensity 
of the group; it also rememorates the most telling images. What 
is obtained is an instantaneous intuition of socialism that lan- 
guage could not offer in a clear way. This is the equivalent of the 
perfect knowledge of Bergsonian philosophy)) (Bouglé: 41 3). 
Bouglé concludes that the weakness of Sorel's perspective 
is that a society is not a factory and that the new society cannot 
be constituted by an assemblage of factories. In a critique to one 
of Sorel's colleagues - Lagardelle - Durkheim had insisted that 
classes cannot be cut off from the national milieu. What is, then, 
missing in Sorel is a proper sociological perspective. However, 
one ofthe merits ofthe Bergsonian syndicalists is that they have 
emphasised the importance of morality, purity and freedom, 
and these are essential characteristics in any socialist move- 
ment (Ibid: 4 1 5). 
In addition to Vico and Bergson, Sorel also took an early 
interest in Le Bon, which he kept for the rest of his life. A 
correspondence between the two authors took place over 
aproximatedly twenty years (Cahiers de L 'Herne, 1986,53). In 
spite of the ideological differences Le Bon was always opposed 
to socialism), they both appreciated each other's work; in 1901 Le 
Bon's considered Sorel as the «most erudite of French socialists)), 
while Sorel referred to Le Bon, in 191 1, as «the greatest psycholo- 
gist that we have in France)) (Sand 1986: 166-7). 
In 1895 Sorel reviewed Le Bon's Lapsychologie des foules 
(1 895) for Le Devenir social. Although Sorel found in the book 
interesting information and ingenious remarks, the review is 
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rather short and critica1 of crowd psychology, and in particular 
of L,e Bon's equating crowds to nations, sects, social classes, 
etc. Furthermore, Sorel doubted the degree of scientificity that 
could be attached to categories such as suggestion, contagion, 
etc, which constituted Le Bon's main explanatory conceptual 
arsenal (Sand 1986: 167-8). 
A few years later, in a review of Le Bon's Lapsychologie 
du socialisme (1 898)' Sorel (1 899) agreed that socialism was 
esseintially a mental state, and that a parallelism could be estab- 
lished between the history of socialism and the history of Chris- 
tianity. Le Bon insisted in «the notion of socialism as a religious 
pheinomenon, appealing to the affective, dreamlike and chi- 
merical qualities of human nature)) (Nye 1973: 427). 
By the time Sorel was writing RejZections, that is, 1905- 
19016, his attitude towards Le Bon was much more positive, 
eveii concerning concerning Le Bon's idea of the spontaneity of 
the inasses. Although it is perhaps still true that his idea of myth 
owes more to Vico and Bergson than to Le Bon, it is plain that 
Le Bon's idées images inspired Sorel's definition of the myth 
as «an organisation of images capable of evoking instinctively 
al1 sentiments that correspond to the different manifestations of 
the war of socialism against modern society)) (Sand 1986: 17 1). 
Furthermore, Le Bon insisted in the idea that images have to be 
taken as a whole, that is, they cannot be broken into their com- 
poncrnt parts; a point that Sorel shared concerning myths. As he 
put it: ((C'est l'ensemble dumythe qui importe seul)) (1 972: 152) 
[«It is myth in its entirety which is alone important)) (1972: 
126)l. 
It could be said that there is still quite a conceptual gap 
betvrreen Le Bon and Sorel; after all, if Le Bon's main focus is 
the c:rowd, Sorel's main interest is class confrontation. Although 
both collective groups are characterised by irrational states of 
conscience, classes and crowds are very different; in the former 
menibers preserve their individuality, while in the latter they 
are dissolved in the mass. Certainpsychological mechanisms of 
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crowd behaviour (hatred, revenge, jealousy), are not approprite 
to characterise classes which are meant to exhibit class con- 
sciousness (Sand 1986: 17 1-2). On the other hand, after 1908 
Sorel seems to agree with Croce that socialism is dead. There 
follows the so called nationalist period of Sorel in which he 
sustains that the only reservoirs of moral force are the nation 
and tradition. 
Sorel and the concept of social myth 
We can now bring together the diferent strands that converge in 
Sorel's Reflections. Sorel is interested in the nature of symbolic 
images and their effect on political action. His main contribu- 
tion to this field is to have pointed out that human behaviour is 
far from being rational; that a number of spontaneous and emo- 
tive elements are part and parcel of political motivation. 
If we focus on his idea of myth he defines it «as an emotion- 
ally charged artificial construct, which though perhaps inaccu- 
rate or absurd, reaches people at a deeply conscious leve1 and 
inspires them to action! (Gross 1982: 104). This author, in a 
remarkable article, provides us with a number of key points 
concerning Sorel's treatment of myth (Gross 1982): 
First, ((myths cannot be cognitively understood, because 
they operate in some prereflexive area of the mind where 
intuitions and beliefs are also stimulated)) (104) 
Second, ((myths are frequently objectifications of the con- 
victions of a group, that is, an expression, in the form of 
images, ofthe goals and aspirations of an entire collectivity)) 
(1 04). 
Third, ((myths are too amorphous and volatile to be sub- 
jected to scientific study)) (104). 
Fourth, «myths are neither true nor false, nor can they be 
separated in its component parts. Only the consequences of 
a myth can reveal its validity)) (105). 
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Fifth, ((myths, as action-images, cannot be refuted; the power 
of a myth (or a belief) rests on faith, which is not open to 
rational analysis)) (1 05). 
Sixth, «it is because they are undemonstrable that myths 
have such a powerful appeal for the masses. People want 
and need to believe: myths seize the imagination with great 
orce and provoke emotions and qualitites of sacrifice and 
struggle which allow for heroic deeds)) (105). 
Seventh, ((myths tap a vital part of the psyche which would 
be otherwise unactivated)) (105). 
Eighth, ((myths are not lies, propaganda or ideology in the 
modern sense of these words. They are not cynically manu- 
factured either. Myths are already present, in a latent form, 
within the mass itself. They are already anchored in the 
collective unconscious (Jung))) (1 05). 
When assessing the validity of myths, Sorel believed that 
they were only effective if they encouraged morality, action and 
creativity. Myths are conveyed by means of symbols which 
appi:al to the imagination and emotions. For Sorel, symbols are 
the objectification of a myth, that is, a word or a thing represent- 
ing something else. Symbols are forms of expressing a mythical 
conient. The only symbols that Sorel discusses are the spoken 
wor~ds; in his work there is no reference to signs, emblems, 
psoters, etc. Speech is essential for the man of action because 
it is evocative, inspiring and stirs up emotions. In Reflections, 
Sorel mentions as examples of valid myths the following his- 
torical examples: homeric myths and heroism, Christianityys 
Second Coming and moral progress, the French Revolution and 
the lwill to victory and, in modern times, the proletariat's myth 
of tlie general strike (Gross: 108). 
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Durkheim EFRL 11.7 & Conclusion: effervescence and social 
psychology. The shadow of Le Bon. 
1 shall start this section with a controversia1 quote from Svend 
Arnulf (1939). Referring to the EFRL, he quotes from the con- 
clusion the well-known passage in which Durkheim says: 
«The day will come when our societies will know again 
hours of creative effervescence, in the course of which new 
ideals will be born and new formulae emerge which will for 
a time serve as guide to humanity)) (FEVR 1960: 710; 
Pickering 1975: 157). 
Durkheim is nowhere explicit as to which institutional forms 
will effect the salvation, and Ranulf asks rhetorically:»is not the 
rise of fascism an event which, in due logic, Durkheim ought to 
have welcomed as that salvation from individualism for which 
he had been trying rather gropingly to prepare the way?)) (Ranulf 
1939: 31). 
This comment could be easily dismissed suggesting that it 
reflects the musings of a disgruntled, unemployed Scandinavian 
sociologist. However, what is fascinating is that in the article 
Ranulf refers to, and quotes from, two letters that Marcel Mauss 
had addressed to him. In the first letter (November 1936) 
Mauss writes as follows: 
((Durkheim and 1 were the founders of the theory of the 
authority of the seprésentation collective. That great modern 
societies, which had more or less emerged from the Middle 
Ages, could be subject to suggestion as Australians are by 
their dances, and made to him around like children in a ring, 
is something that we had not really foreseen. We did not put 
our minds to this return to primitivism. We were satisfied 
with a few alusions to the state of the crowds, when some- 
thing quite different was at stake)) (Gane 1992: 214). 
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In another letter (May 1939), Mauss concludes: 
((1 think that al1 this is a real tragedy for us, an unwelcome 
verification of the things we had been suggesting and the 
proof that we should perhaps have expected this verifica- 
tion in the bad case rather than a verification in the good)) 
(Gane 1992: 214-5). 
In the light of these texts by Durkheim and Mauss, it is 
perhaps pertinent to ask: what was the meaning of the future 
effervescence that Durkheim had in mind?. We know what 
Arnulf had to say. Mauss' letters are highly ambiguous, sug- 
gesting, on the one hand that, that the Durkheimian School had 
discovered in collective effervescence an important social 
mec;hanism, but, on the other hand, that this could be put to 
rather obnoxious use by modern totalitarian states. 
Another Durkheimian, Bouglé, writing in the late nineteenth 
thirties, interprets Durkheim's reference to the future in a rather 
diffixent, perhaps more positive way. He suggests that when 
Durkheim refers to a rejuvenating faith he is thinking essen- 
tially of socialism. And that, like Sorel, he presents socialism as 
a fa:ith, and not as a science (Bouglé 1938: 34-5). 
Since Sorel's name has cropped up in Bouglé's text, it is 
perfiaps of some interest to find out what did Mauss think about 
Sorí:l and about the relationship between Sorel and Durkheim. 
Wri.ting in 1925 Mauss showed sympathy for some of the cha- 
racteristics of the Russian Revolution; in particular the soviets 
(as a professional organisation in which property and political 
functions were vested upon) correspond to the moral, political 
and economic conclusions thart Durkheim had reached in La 
division du travail social and other texts. In a somewhat cava- 
lier fashion Mauss attributes the affinity between Durkheim's 
theo'ry and Soviet praxis to the role of George Sorel, who ha- 
ving; borrowed these ideas from Durkheim, then influenced Lenin 
(Mauss 1925). Quite a farfetched genealogy ! 
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Ten years later, in 1936, and with the hindsight of fascist 
regimes in existence, Mauss's attitude towards Bolshevism has 
changed and tends to see strong affinities between communism 
and fascism - the latter tyranny deriving from the former. In a 
letter to Elie Halévy he wrote the following: 
«The basic doctrine from which al1 of this is deduced is that 
ofthe minorités agissantes (active minorities) as it was called 
in Parisian anarcho-syndicalist circles, and particularly as it 
was developed by Sorel (...) The same doctrine of the mi- 
nority, of violence and the same corporatism, have spread 
in my lifetime from Sorel to Lenin and Mussolini. Al1 three 
recognise it. Let me add that Sorel's corporatism was 
halfways between that of Pouget and that of Durkheim, and 
eventually came for Sorel to correspond to a reactionary 
view of the past of our societies)) (Mauss 1983:2) (Gane 
1992: 213). 
If anything, this quote puts a lot of weight on the impact of 
Sorel's doctrines, but with the rather curious and implicit objec- 
tive of handing a compliment to Durkheim as the originator of 
the corporatist doctrines. Sorel is obviously the fa11 man, taking 
the blame for the emergence of the tyrannies of the twentieth 
century. Durkheim is left in the background, with his honour 
intact. 
The same Machiavellian role in relation to the origins of 
modern totalitarianism has been attributed to the work of Le 
Bon. Hence, it is time to turn now to Le Bon and Durkheim's 
theory of collective effervescence. There is enough evidence to 
suggest that Durkheim, in his lifetime, insisted in distancing 
himself from Le Bon's sociological approach, denying him any 
scientificity. In spite of this negative attitude, the international 
sociological establishment acceptedLe Bon as abone fide sociolo- 
gist (or at least social psychologist) and his theories were discussed 
inmost history of sociology textbooksuntil well-entered the 1950s. 
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Le Bon was taken seriously by avariety of scholars: Freud, Weber, 
MacDougall, Adorno, Michels, Sorokin, etc. 
Part of the problem, of course, has to do with the proble- 
matic relations between sociology and psychology in the 
Durkheimian School. Daniel Essertier wrote in 1927 that ((crowd 
phenomena play a preponderant role in Durkheim's EFRL; by 
a singular turn of events, books such as those of Dr. Le Bon, 
which in fact were subjected to criticism by Durkheimn when 
he tireated psychological explanation in sociology, explicitly or 
implicitly carry authority in the Durkheimian School)) (Essertier 
1927: 1 1). According to Essertier, this vulgar psychology which 
Durkheim had rightly rejeted made a return in the EFRL. 
In 1927 Marcel Mauss, reviewing Barnes's et al The His- 
tory of the Social Sciences, complained that Kimball Young 
had created a sociological category in which Durkheim, Le Bon 
and Sighele were placed together. The idea of an ((intensive 
collective psychology~ to which Durkheim would belong he 
fourid it ((extremely abusive)) (Mauss 1969: 285). In recent times 
both Lukes (1973) and Pickering (1984) have been critica1 of 
any attempts to insinuate that Durkheim's theory of collective 
effervescence was influenced by crow psychology in general 
and Le Bon in particular. 
Lukes is somewhat ambiguous in his presentation of the 
case. On the one hand, he admits that ((Durkheimwas doubtedless 
affected by the crop of studies in crowd psycho-logy)) (1973: 
462:), but he adds that ((there is no evidence that he was specifi- 
cally influenced by any of them)) (ibid.). And the reasons, in so 
far as Le Bon is concerned, are that ((Durkheim would have been 
the llast person to regard Le Bon as a serious social scientist)) 
(ibid). 
Pickering (1 984) dedicates two chapters (21st and 22nd) to 
the topic of effervescent assembly, but it is in chapter 22nd that 
he fi~cuses on the issue of crowd psychology. It is not easy to 
summarise his argument, which is detailed and complex, but he 
conc:ludes that ({Durkheim does not see collective effervescence 
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primarily, if indeed at all, in terms of crowd psychology)) 
(1984: 402). In fact, neither Lukes nor Pickering engage in 
a detail analysis of Le Bon's Psycholoie des foules, so we are 
left with the problem of comparing Durkheim with the ghost 
of Le Bon. 
We have established that in the context ofDurkheim's treat- 
ment of collective effervescence he never refers to the work of 
Le Bon. Both Lukes and Pickering refer to the only footnote in 
the EFRL (Durkheim 1960:300 which can throw some light on 
the influence of crowd psychology on Durkheim's work. The 
reference is to a book by Otto Stoll entitled Suggestion und 
Hypnotismus in der Volkerpsychologie. Durkheim quotes from 
the second edition of 1904 (the first edition was in 1894). Now, 
who was Otto Stoll?. We know that he was a medical doctor by 
training and a Professor of Geography and Ethnology at the 
University Of Zürich. His area of ethnographic expertise was 
Central America. In addition to technical ethnographic books, 
in 1908 he published a more popular book entitled Das 
Geschlechtsleben in der Volkerpsychologie (which roughly 
translates as Sexual Life of the Savages). 
His Suggestion und Hypnotismus in der Volkerpsychologie 
was meant as a sort of manual; it is essentially a descriptive text 
(both historically and ethnographically oriented), with very lit- 
tle analysis. The second edition was reviewed by Marcel Mauss 
in L 'Année Sociologique (1903-4). Mauss compte rendu is 
generally positive, emphasising «la nature suggestive de la re- 
ligion et l'influence suggestive de ses répresentations)) (1903- 
4: 234). Perhaps the most interesting thing in Mauss' reviw is 
the reference to a book by Friedmann entitled Über Wahnideen 
in Volkerleben [Hallucination in Primitive Society] (1 90 1). This 
text is perhaps the missing link in the crowd psychology saga of 
Durkheim. In it the author presents, according to Mauss, the 
idea that «the excitation psychologique of the masses is in fact 
the most powerful moment of social life in general and of reli- 
gious life in particular)) (1903-4: 234). 
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IPerhaps it does not matter so much whether Durkheim's 
theory of collective effervescence originated from crowd psy- 
chology or not. The crucial issue which seems to be at stake is 
the relationship between the social sciences and psychology. 
Durlcheimians have always been reluctant to incorporate psy- 
chological explanatins into their theoretical framework. It is 
against the Rules! On the other hand, a sociologist like Raymond 
Aroii, when looking at the EFRL said that the phenomena of 
((effkrvescence are the very paradigm of that psychological and 
social process in which religions are born)) (Aron 1967: 355). 
Thai. it is possible to read EFRL 11.7. in the light of a theory 
which takes on board psychological and sociological elements 
we Iiave the example of Moscocivi's La Machine a faire des 
dieux (1989). 
This paper has no obvious conclusion, because whether we 
refer to Sorel or to Le Bon there can never be a convincing 
ansvver to the question: to which extent was Durkheim influ- 
ence:d by them? And the simple reason is that in the EFRL 
Durldieim does not cite them. So, what is the point of the whole 
exercise? Essentially, to recover the richness and complexity of 
the turn of the century social scientific (and in a wider sense 
intellectual) scene. Both Sorel and Le Bon played an important 
part in it; if we lose them, our inheritance, our sociological 
capital (to use Bourdieu's expression) is diminished. And this 
has also an impact on our contemporary, current sociological 
endeavours. If in addition to that it can help to clarify or en- 
lighten certain aspects of Durkheim's work, al1 the better. 
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ABSTRACT 
Through a comparison of Durkheim's Elementary Forms of 
Religious Life and Sorel's ReJlections on Violence, the paper 
explores the convergences and divergences between these two 
very different authors. What characterises and gives unity to the 
work of both men is the search for a new morality. This can only 
be ascertained when Durkheim and Sorel are placed in the wider 
political and intellectual framework of turn of the century France. 
The reason for these parallelisms stem from the fact that both 
authors shared a good number of philosophical sources. 
RESUM 
Mitjancant una comparació de les Formes Elementals de la 
Vida Religiosa de Durkheim i les ReJlexions sobre la Viol2ncia 
de Sorel, aquest article analitza les convergkncies i divergkncies 
entre aquests dos autors tan diferents. Allo que caracteritza i 
dona unitat a l'obra de Durkheim i Sorel és la recerca d'una 
nova moralitat. Aixo nomes ho podem veure quan els situem 
dins del marc polític i intel.lectua1 de la Franca de finals de 
segle. Aquests paral.lelismes s'expliquen pel fet que ambdos 
autors compartien un bon nombre de fonts filosofiques. 
